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Abstract
Emotional stimuli can be processed even when participants perceive them without conscious awareness, but the extent to
which unconsciously processed emotional stimuli influence implicit memory after short and long delays is not fully
understood. We addressed this issue by measuring a subliminal affective priming effect in Experiment 1 and a long-term
priming effect in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, a flashed fearful or neutral face masked by a scrambled face was presented
three times, then a target face (either fearful or neutral) was presented and participants were asked to make a fearful/neutral
judgment. We found that, relative to a neutral prime face (neutral–fear face), a fearful prime face speeded up participants’
reaction to a fearful target (fear–fear face), when they were not aware of the masked prime face. But this response pattern
did not apply to the neutral target. In Experiment 2, participants were first presented with a masked faces six times during
encoding. Three minutes later, they were asked to make a fearful/neutral judgment for the same face with congruent
expression, the same face with incongruent expression or a new face. Participants showed a significant priming effect for
the fearful faces but not for the neutral faces, regardless of their awareness of the masked faces during encoding. These
results provided evidence that unconsciously processed stimuli could enhance emotional memory after both short and long
delays. It indicates that emotion can enhance memory processing whether the stimuli are encoded consciously or
unconsciously.
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Introduction
Many studies have shown that emotional stimuli can be
processed even when participants perceive them without conscious
awareness [1–4]. The experimental paradigms used frequently for
rendering visual stimuli unconscious include backward masking
[5–7] and binocular rivalry [8,9]. In the backward masking
paradigm, a stimulus is usually presented for a short duration, and
then replaced by a mask to interrupt visual processing related to
the stimulus and thus excludes awareness. In addition, information
that fails to reach awareness still appears to guide our behavior
and affect processing of the stimuli that we are aware of [10]. In
some situations, unconsciously processed stimuli could affect
behavioral performance more profoundly than stimuli that are
consciously processed [11]. However, the extent to which
unconsciously processed emotional information influences subse-
quent memory process is not fully understood.
Memory processes consist of encoding, consolidation, and
retrieval phases. Based on whether participants consciously
retrieve information, memory could be further divided into
explicit and implicit memory [12], whether information is encoded
consciously or not. Note that in an experimental environment,
when participants unconsciously process stimuli, it is difficult for
them to explicitly retrieve the stimuli. Therefore, implicit memory
tests (e.g., subliminal affective priming, lexical decision) are usually
adopted to explore the effect of prior unconscious experience on
subsequent behavioral performance [12]. Priming effect, a type of
implicit memory, is thus defined as changes in reaction time (RT)
or response accuracy for repeated items in comparison with new
items [12–14]. By using subliminal affective priming paradigms
[15–21], studies found that subjects responded to a target more
quickly and accurately when its valence was the same as a prime
than when they were different. For example, unconsciously
processed negative faces (vs. neutral faces) were more quickly
judged as negative [17]. Judgment of neutral targets is also
influenced by the valence of primes. Chinese characters were rated
higher in likability when preceded by happy faces for 4 ms than
when preceded by angry faces. However, when the faces were
presented for 1000 ms, the priming effects diminished [19].
There are several issues that need further investigation. One is
that subliminal priming effect may be contaminated by a conscious
component [9,15,22,23]. For example, stimulus durations around
30 ms in previous studies (e.g., 33 ms in [7]; 20 ms in [15]) are not
short enough to ensure unconscious processing, because some
participants were able to detect faces with a 33 ms duration [23].
Therefore, it is necessary to use both objective and subjective
criteria to separate participants into aware and unaware groups in
subliminal affective priming studies.
The second issue is that previous studies did not elucidate
whether the subliminal priming effect was different between
emotional and neutral stimuli. For explicit memory, emotional
stimuli could be remembered better than neutral stimuli, with
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tests. Emotional contexts also enhance memory of subsequent
neutral stimuli compared with neutral contexts [2,24–26]. Note
that, in addition to the difference in memory retrieval, these
studies differ from those using subliminal affective priming
paradigms in that stimuli are encoded consciously and retrieved
after a long delay [24]. As for implicit emotional memory,
although the subliminal priming effect is robust, it is unclear
whether the priming effect of emotional stimuli is different from
that of neutral stimuli. This issue is important; if true, it would
indicate that emotion enhances memory process, regardless of the
stimuli are processed consciously or unconsciously.
The third issue concerns how long the affective priming effect
lasts. Studies have shown that significant influence of preceded
emotional stimuli only occurred at short stimulus onset asynchronies
(SOA) [16–18,27,28]. Affective priming is largest when the SOA is
0–150 ms, and diminishes when the SOA is longer than 300 ms,
because automatic activation occurs at a very early stage of
information processing, and dissipates quickly [16,18]. Only a few
studies have explored the long-term influence of unconsciously
processed emotional stimuli [29–31]. For example, when fearful and
disgusting pictures werepresented for 40 ms, participantsweremore
likely to complete word stems using fearful and disgusting words
[30], suggesting that specific emotional responses can be induced
without awareness (i.e., participants do not have a conscious
emotional experience). Nevertheless, due to possible involvement
of conscious processing, it is necessary to address this issue by
ensuring that encoding processing is completely unconscious.
In this study, two experiments were designed to investigate
whether unconscious processing could enhance implicit emotional
memory after short and long delays. To ensure that participants
processed faces unconsciously, the backward masking paradigm
was used, and subjective and objective assessments for awareness
were adopted for each experiment. In Experiment 1, the
subliminal affective priming paradigm was adopted. After a
masked fearful or neutral face was presented three times,
participants were asked to make a fearful/neutral judgment to a
target face. Half of the target faces were repeated faces (congruent
condition), and the other half were faces with the same identity but
a new expression (incongruent condition). In Experiment 2, a
long-term priming task was adopted. Participants were presented
with a masked faces six times during encoding. Three minutes
later, they were asked to make an emotional judgment for
congruent and incongruent faces. Note that we presented faces for
multiple times during encoding. Studies have suggested that
implicit memories are formed after multiple presentations,
including unconsciously conditioned reflexes [5], observational
learning [32], and implicit learning [33]. Our preliminary data
also suggested that priming effect for faces occurs after more than
one-time presentation. In addition, because anxiety trait and state
influence emotional processing [34], participants were assessed by
the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) to ensure that they
had no obvious change of anxiety status before and after the
experiment.
Previous studies have shown that fearful faces could be
unconsciously processed, leading to increased activation in the
amygdala and subcortical regions [1,35]. If unconscious activation
for fearful faces is sufficient, the priming effect for fearful faces, but
not for neutral faces, would be significant after a short delay. In
addition, the increased activation in the amygdala could in turn
increase attention and cortical activation to fearful faces [2,26],
and could further increase corticosteroid releases [25]. If this also
applies to implicit memory of emotional stimuli, the priming effect
for fearful faces would occur after a long delay.
Results
Experiment 1
Participants were divided into aware and unaware groups by
their awareness assessments. The analyses of d9 and A9 confirmed
that the two groups of participants had different awareness levels
(F(1,58)=31.35 for d9 and F(1,58)=31.22 for A9, both ps,.0001).
The Prime6Target6Group ANOVA showed a significant
interaction among Prime, Target, and Group (F(1,57)=5.65,
p,.02, partial g
2=.09), and a significant effect of Target
(F(1,57)=6.74, p,.01, partial g
2=.11), with other effects did
not reach significance (ps..3).
After the sample size was matched between groups, the results
also showed a significant difference between the groups for d9 and
A9 (both ps,.0001). Figure 1 illustrates the ROC curves for both
unaware and aware groups. The ROC curves were obtained by
computing the cumulative Hit and False Alarm rates for each
confidence level across participants in unaware and aware groups.
The d9 (vs. 0) and A9 (vs. 0.5) were significantly higher than chance
level for the aware group (t(17)=5.24, p,.0001 for d9 and
t(17)=4.98, p,.0001 for A9), but lower than chance level for the
unaware group (t(19)=2.27, p,.04 for d9 and t(19)=1.74, p,.1
for A9) (Table 1). There were no significant effects for accuracy (all
ps..1) (Table 2). For RTs, the ANOVA of Condition (congruent
vs. incongruent) by group showed a significant interaction
(F(1,36)=4.25, p,.05, partial g
2=.11), with their main effects
not significant (p..8). The ANOVA of Prime6Target6Group
further showed a significant interaction among Prime, Target, and
Group (F(1,36)=4.25, p,.05, partial g
2=.11), but marginal
significance for Target effect (F(1,36)=6.74, p,.08, partial
g
2=.09). There were no significant main effects of Prime
(F(1,36)=2.2, p..15), Group (F(1,36)=0.01, p..93), and other
interactions (ps..5). After controlling for influence of RT
difference in fearful and neutral faces (F(1,36)=.21, p..65), the
ANOVA for facilitated RTs also showed a significant interaction
among Prime, Target and Group (F(1,36)=4.25, p,.05, partial
g
2=.11), with other main effects and interactions not significant
(ps..1).
The interaction of Prime, Target, and Group was significant,
indicating that different priming patterns were obtained for the
aware and unaware groups (Figure 2). For the unaware group,
fear–fear faces were judged more quickly than neutral–fear faces
(p,.03), but neutral–neutral faces were judged with RTs
comparable with fear–neutral faces (p..9). In contrast, for the
aware group, the congruent faces were judged more slowly than
incongruent faces, although the simple effects were not significant
(p..1).
Experiment 1 showed that only for unaware participants, the
fear–fear faces were judged more quickly than the neutral–fear
faces, and the neutral–neutral faces were judged with comparable
RTs to the fear–neutral faces. Our data was consistent with
previous studies [15–17,19], and confirmed that primes could
influence subsequent judgments of emotion when participants
were unaware of their presentation. The influence may result from
the automatic activation of fearful feature of faces in the amygdala
when they were unconsciously processed [16,17]. In contrast, it
seems that awareness of the primes hampers the affective priming
effect [10,19,36,37].
Experiment 2
The interval between the prime and target faces was only
500 ms in Experiment 1. It remained to be determined whether
the significant priming effect for the fearful faces could occur when
the study–test interval is longer. We addressed this issue in
Implicit Emotional Memory
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judgment 3 min after they were exposed to masked faces for six
times. Similarly, participants were separated into unaware and
aware groups according to whether they were aware of masked
faces by subjective and objective assessments.
The analyses of d9 and A9 confirmed that the two groups of
participants had different awareness levels (F(1,69)=111.48 for d9
and F(1,69)=174.51 for A9, both ps,.0001). The Prime6Tar-
get6Group ANOVA showed a significant interaction between
Prime and Target (F(1,69)=4.34, p,.05, partial g
2=.06), and a
significant effect of Target (F(1,69)=15.71, p,.0001, partial
g
2=.19), with other effects did not reach significance (ps..1).
After the sample size was matched between groups, the results
also showed significant differences between the groups for d9 and
A9 (both ps,.0001) (Figure 1, right). The d9 (vs. 0) and A9 (vs. 0.5)
were significantly higher than chance level for the aware group
(t(23)=10.59, p,.0001 for d9 and t(23)=17.56, p,.0001 for A9),
but were comparable to chance level for the unaware group
(t(22)=1.19, p..25 for d9 and t(22)=1.03, p..3 for A9) (Table 1).
For RTs, the Condition by Group ANOVA showed a significant
effect of Condition (F(2,90)=4.49, p,.01, partial g
2=.10),
because congruent faces were judged more quickly than
incongruent faces (p,.02) and new faces (p,.09). The congruent
effect was mainly contributed by fearful faces, because the
Prime6Target6Group ANOVA showed a significant interaction
between Prime6Target (F(1,45)=7.96, p,.007, partial g
2=.15),
with the effects of Prime (F(1,45)=1.21, p..27) and other
interactions not significant (all ps..4). The interaction between
Prime and Target was manifested as fear–fear faces were judged
more quickly than neutral–fear faces (p,.002), but neutral–neutral
faces were judged at a comparable level of fear–neutral faces
(p..2) (Figure 3). Note that both groups showed a similar pattern,
with no significant effect of Group (F(1,45)=074, p..4).
Because fearful faces were responded more quickly than neutral
faces (519 ms vs. 549 ms, F(1,45)=18.66, p,.001, partial
g
2=.29), we therefore calculated and analyzed the facilitated
RTs for each condition. The ANOVA for facilitated RTs also
showed a significant interaction between Prime and Target
(F(1,45)=7.96, p,.01, partial g
2=.15), with other main effects
and interactions not significant (p..3). The results showed a
significant priming effect for fearful faces compared with neutral
faces irrespective of the awareness. For accuracy, the aware group
had higher accuracy than the unaware group (0.97 vs. 0.95,
F(1,45)=4.97, p,.03, partial g
2=.10), but no other significant
effects were found (all ps..10).
Consistent with Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2
Figure 1. ROC curves for Experiment 1 and 2. The ROC curves were obtained by computing the cumulative Hit and False Alarm rates for each
confidence level across participants in unaware and aware groups. The curves for unaware and aware groups were different in both experiments (left
for Experiment 1 and right for Experiment 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014641.g001
Table 1. d9 and A9 scores for Experiment 1 & 2.
Exp.1 Exp.2
d9 A9 d9 A9
Aware 0.656.52 0.646.12 1.306.59 0.786.08
Unaware 20.216.41 0.476.08 0.126.30 0.526.08
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014641.t001
Table 2. Response accuracy under each condition for
Experiment 1 & 2.
Fear-fear Neut-fear Neut-neut Fear-neut New fear New neut
Exp.1 .956.08 .966.06 .976.06 .966.08 .956.07 .986.04
Exp.2 .966.06 .966.07 .946.07 .966.07 .976.06 .976.05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014641.t002
Implicit Emotional Memory
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faces, whether participants encoded faces consciously or uncon-
sciously. Unlike Experiment 1, participants in the aware group
showed a similar pattern to that in the unaware group. It is
possible that after six presentations and a 3 min delay, the encoded
faces, whether they were consciously perceived or not, were
processed in a similar way. These data supported the view that
unconscious processing could influence subsequent behavioral
performance over time.
Discussion
The object of this study was to explore the extent to which
unconsciously processed emotional stimuli influence subsequent
implicit memory after short and long delays. There are two novel
findings. First, the significant priming effect for fearful faces was
shown using the affective priming paradigm, with the fear–fear
faces being judged more quickly than neutral–fear faces for the
unaware participants. Second, the significant priming effect for
fearful faces was also shown after a long delay using the long-term
priming paradigm, whether participants were aware of the primed
faces during encoding. These data provided evidence that the
affective priming effect existed even when the SOA was longer
than 300 ms. In addition, they indicated that emotion enhances
memory processes whether the stimuli are processed consciously or
unconsciously.
Unconscious Processing under Backward Masking
It is crucial to ensure that participants process stimuli
unconsciously in the subliminal priming paradigm. However, in
many previous studies using the backward masking paradigm to
render stimuli unconscious, the durations are not short enough to
ensure that the processing is unconscious [9,22,23]. Thus,
controlling participants’ awareness level has been a challenge in
such studies. In this study, we adopted several approaches to
ensure that participants processed the masked faces unconsciously.
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1. For the unaware participants, the fear–fear faces were judged more quickly than the neutral–fear faces, but the
neutral–neutral faces were judged with RTs comparable to the fear–neutral faces.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014641.g002
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2. For both groups of participants, the fear–fear faces were judged more quickly than the neutral–fear faces, but
the neutral–neutral faces were judged with RTs comparable to the fear–neutral faces.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014641.g003
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criteria. Depending on whether participants were aware of the
masked faces, they were divided into two groups. Second, to
ensure that the mask did not influence the valence judgment of the
target face, the scrambled faces were used as masks. This was
different from previous studies that used neutral faces from the
same person as masks [5,22,23]. Neutral faces are usually judged
as untrustworthy and potentially dangerous, and they might lead
to activation in the amygdala and visual cortex [38,39]. In
contrast, scrambled faces have advantages of being comparable
with faces in visual features (e.g., contour, brightness). They are
also meaningless to participants, and have been demonstrated to
be effective in preventing conscious processing of stimuli [22]. It
should be noted that stimulus duration in the backward masking
paradigm was short, thus it would be interesting to use other
paradigms (e.g., binocular rivalry) to investigate the implicit
emotional memory, although the paradigms may rely on different
mechanisms [40].
Priming Effects for Fearful Faces after a Short Delay
Using the subliminal affective priming paradigm, we obtained a
significant priming effect for the fearful faces, but not for the
neutral faces, showing that fear–fear faces were judged more
quickly than neutral–fear faces. Our study not only confirmed the
subliminal affective priming effect that was obtained in previous
studies [17–19,21], but also extended them in that the affective
priming effect existed even when the SOA was longer than
300 ms. The difference in material type and presentation time
may account for the discrepancy between ours and previous
studies. We used faces as stimuli, rather than words [27] or
pictures [28]. Emotional faces may evoke stronger physiological
and neural responses than affective scene pictures [41]; thus, it is
possible that fearful faces elicit more activation in the brain even
when unconsciously processed, especially when they are presented
multiple times.
The facilitation in affective priming is thought to depend on
automatic spreading activation in brain regions related to stimulus
processing [13,16]. As the amygdala is related to the affective
priming effect [42–44], it is possible that after multiple
presentations of faces, the amygdala and related subcortical
regions are activated especially for the fearful faces [5,9]. The
fearful faces could then attract more attention, and their activation
could spread automatically to the related network, thus facilitate
subsequent valence-congruent judgment of the fearful faces [16].
Note that affective priming was only obtained for unaware
participants. Participants who were aware of the primes showed
the opposite pattern (i.e., quicker response for incongruent faces
than congruent faces), although the difference did not reach
significance. It was consistent with previous studies that reported
negative priming effect [34]. This usually happens when the prime
duration is longer, or the primes are highly attended. One view
claims that when participants are aware of the prime, they will
adopt strategic resistance to enhanced influence of the prime.
Indeed, negative priming effects are larger when participants are
aware of primes (vs. unaware), or remember the primes (vs. forget)
[19,37].
Priming Effects for Fearful Faces after a Long Delay
Previous studies on explicit emotional memory have shown that,
with different types of encoding tasks, emotional stimuli are usually
better remembered than neutral stimuli [24]. Unlike these studies,
we asked participants to process the faces unconsciously, and
tested memory with the typical long-term priming paradigm. Our
results and others [29,30,45] indicated that emotion enhances
memory processes, whether the faces are processed consciously or
unconsciously.
We found significant priming effects for fearful faces not only
after the short delay, but also after the long delay for unaware
groups of participants. But we did not find priming effects for
neutral faces in both experiments, although the effects showed a
non-significant pattern in Experiment 2. The two experiments
varied in some method details. For example, participants were
asked to make judgments seconds after a face was presented three
times in Experiment 1, but were tested three minutes later after all
faces were presented six times in Experiment 2. One possibility
was that with more learning exposures and longer retention, there
is more automatic spreading activation in related regions [15,16],
which led to different results on neutral faces in the two
experiments. Another possibility was that there are distinct
mechanisms mediating subliminal affective priming and long-term
priming effects. To support the second possibility, both aware and
unaware groups of participants illustrated similar patterns of
priming effect in Experiment 2, but they showed different patterns
of priming effects in Experiment 1. In addition, a recent study
found that short-lag priming is related to decreased activity in the
occipito-temporal cortex, but the long-lag priming effect is also
related to decreased activity in the ventral frontal cortex and
increased activity in the parietal and frontal regions [46].
On the other hand, there could be a common mechanism
underlies the long-term priming effect for implicit and explicit
emotional memory. Previous studies have suggested that explicit
emotional memory depends on enhanced attention [48] and
memory consolidation mechanisms [25]. Unconsciously processed
stimuli could enhance the activity in the amygdala. The activation
in the amygdala and prefrontal cortex could also increase attention
and cortical activation [2,26,36,46,47]. Cholinergic enhancement
can also enhance the priming effect for emotional faces [48]. The
longer the retention, the more enhanced memory might be for
emotional stimuli [24]. On the other hand, previous studies have
found that priming effect could change from positive to negative as
a function of prime duration [36,49]. The extent to which the
significant priming effect for fearful faces lasts over time needs
further investigation. In addition, fearful faces differed from
neutral faces in both the levels of arousal and valence in our study;
and there was discrepancy between the race of the subjects
(Chinese) and the race of the stimuli (both eastern and western
faces). Future studies are needed to dissociate the effects of valence,
arousal and race, to determine whether there are different
mechanisms for priming effects and explicit memory.
In conclusion, our study found that after participants encoded
masked faces but were not aware of them, they judged fear–fear
faces more quickly than neutral–fear faces after short and long
delays. These data provided evidence that unconsciously learned
emotional stimuli facilitate subsequent emotional memory over
time. Considering that some emotional disorders, such as anxiety,
phobias, and posttraumatic stress disorder, may also be related to
multiple unconscious exposures to emotional stimuli, our study
indicated how long and to what extent unconscious processing is
sufficient for significant priming effects for emotional faces.
Methods
Experiment 1
Participants. Sixty-one (21.8761.73 years old, 30 male)
right-handed, healthy native Chinese-speaking students at Peking
University took part in this experiment. They had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and no history of neurological trauma
or psychiatric disorders. All participants were paid for their
Implicit Emotional Memory
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with the procedures and protocols approved by the Human
Participants Review Committee of Peking University.
Materials. Sixty face photographs of 30 persons (15 male and
15 female) showing either fearful or neutral expressions were used.
Some of them were selected from the NimStim database, and
others were taken for Chinese students. Half of the faces were
western people, and half eastern people. The faces were selected
based on their valence or arousal scores, determined by a group of
37 Chinese participants at Peking University using a nine-point
Likert scale. Their rating scores showed that, the fearful faces were
more unpleasant (3.016.30 vs. 4.496.39, t(59)=25.12, p,.0001),
and more arousing (6.2360.28 vs. 4.2060.26, t(59)=45.25,
p,.0001) than the neutral faces. Phase-scrambled images for all
faces were created to serve as masks and control stimuli, each
preserving color and the spatial frequency of the original picture
without depicting face form.
Three factors were included in Experiment 1: Prime (fearful,
neutral) and Target (fearful, neutral) as within-subjects factors, and
awareness group as a between-subjects factor. In turn, there were
four prime–target conditions for each group: fear–fear, fear–
neutral, neutral–fear, and neutral–neutral faces. The prime and
target faces were the same in the fear–fear and neutral–neutral
conditions, so they were also referred to as congruent condition.
The neutral–fear and fear–neutral conditions were referred to as
incongruent condition. All together, there were 20 affectively
congruent (10 fearful–fearful, 10 neutral–neutral), and 20
affectively incongruent (10 fearful–neutral, 10 neutral–fearful)
facial stimuli. Another 20 scrambled prime–facial target pairs (10
scrambled prime–fearful targets, 10 scrambled prime–neutral
targets) were included to be new fearful and neutral faces.
Procedure. Participants took part in the subliminal priming
test and a later assessment of awareness in a soundproof, dimly lit
room. During the subliminal priming phase, each of the 60 trials
started with a fixation point for 500 ms, immediately followed by a
prime face for 12 ms and a scrambled mask for 500 ms. The mask
in a given trial was created using the same face as for the prime in
that trial. This prime-mask presentation was repeated three times
before a target face was presented. Participants were asked to
judge the facial expression (fearful or neutral) of the target face as
quickly and accurately as possible (Figure 4). The target face
disappeared either after participants responded, or after 2 s. All
Figure 4. Experimental procedures for Experiment 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, the masked prime faces were presented for three times, and an
emotional judgment was performed. In Experiment 2, the masked faces were presented for six times during study, and participants were asked to
judge the orientation of the bar. The emotional judgment was performed three minutes after the study phase.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014641.g004
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faces with the same valence were presented consecutively. The
button press was counterbalanced across participants. Participants
had a practice before the formal test.
During the post assessment phase, participants were first asked
whether they saw anything between the fixation and the scrambled
mask. They then completed a detection task to assess their
objective awareness to the prime faces. The procedure was the
same as the procedure for the subliminal priming phase.
Participants were also assessed by the STAI before and after the
experiment.
Data Analysis. The data on awareness detection were
analyzed according to the signal detection theory. The measures
of d9 and area under the ROC curve (A9) were calculated to
characterize each participant’s visual awareness [23]. Participants
were considered as being aware of the prime when they claimed
that they saw masked faces (subjective) or when their d9 or A9
values were significantly different from the chance level (objective)
[50]. The significant p value was set as .05 (two tailed).
Accuracy and RTs of the affective priming task were recorded
for each participant. Data from two participants were excluded
from analysis due to their slower RTs (out of 2.5 SD of the mean).
Among the remaining 59 participants, 18 participants were aware
of the primes (7 as subjective and 11 as objective). The repeated
measures ANOVA, Prime6Target6group, and Condition (con-
gruent vs. incongruent)6group, were adopted. The priming effect
was defined as the difference between congruent and incongruent
conditions. Correspondingly, the priming effect for fearful faces
was the difference between fear–fear and neutral–fear faces, and
priming effect for neutral faces was the difference between
neutral–neutral and fear–neutral faces. To match sample sizes
between the two groups, the number of unaware participants was
reduced to the similar number of aware participants (20 unaware,
and 18 aware) based on their order to be enrolled in the
experiment. The results of matched sample-size groups were
similar to those of the complete groups, and were reported in
detail. In addition, because participants responded to fearful faces
more quickly than to neutral faces (534 ms vs. 556 ms), facilitated
RTs in each condition (i.e., vs. scramble-fear or scramble-neutral
condition) for each participant were calculated and analyzed. The
results were similar to those of original data, thus only the results of
original data were reported. SPSS was used for the analyses
(p,.05, two tailed).
Experiment 2
Participants. Seventy-four young (2262.25 years old, 32
male) right-handed, healthy native Chinese-speaking students at
Peking University took part in this experiment. They had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, and no history of neurological
trauma or psychiatric disorders. All participants were paid for their
participation and gave written informed consent in accordance
with the procedures and protocols approved by the Human
Participants Review Committee of Peking University.
Materials and Procedure. The materials were the same as
those used in Experiment 1. For the experimental procedure,
instead of the affective priming paradigm used in Experiment 1, a
long-term priming paradigm was used, which consisted of four
phases: unconscious encoding/study of faces, a subtraction task, a
subsequent priming test, and post awareness assessments.
During the unconscious encoding/study phase (Figure 4), each
of the 40 masked faces was presented 12 ms for six times. Then, to
engage the participants’ attention to focus on the center of the
screen, a horizontal or vertical bar was presented, and participants
were asked to judge its orientation as quickly and accurately as
possible within 2 s. The priming test was performed after a delay
of 3 min, during which a serial three-subtraction task was
performed. During the test phase, each of the 40 prime faces
and 20 new faces (10 fearful and 10 neutral) was presented on the
center of the screen for 2 s. Of the 40 prime faces, half had the
same facial expressions as those used in the subliminal encoding
(congruent condition), and the other half had a new expression
(incongruent condition). Participants were asked to decide whether
the face was fearful or neutral as quickly and accurately as
possible. The order of the faces was pseudorandomized so that no
more than three faces with the same affective valence were
presented consecutively. The button press was counterbalanced
across participants. Participants had a practice before the formal
test. The post awareness assessments were the same as that in
Experiment 1.
Data Analysis. Data from three participants were excluded
from analysis, one of them not following the instruction, and two
having slower reaction times (out of 2.5 SD of mean). Among the
remaining 71 participants, 23 participants were aware of the
primes. To match sample sizes between the two groups, the
number of unaware participants was reduced to the similar
number of aware participants (24 unaware, and 23 aware) based
on their order to be enrolled in the experiment. The data analysis
was the same as that used in Experiment 1. The results of matched
sample-size groups were similar to those of the complete groups,
and were reported in detail.
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